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Abstract. This paper extends the standard closed shop union model of wage determination 
by introducing endogeneity of union membership. The labor market outcome with 
endogenous membership may differ when unions behave monopsonisticaly relative to the 
case where they are "membership-takers", resulting in higher or lower wages (more or less 
favorable contract curve in efficient bargaining) according to the form union´s utility 
function and/or implicit decision process value union size. Some notes are added 
highlighting the role of membership fees in the membership function determination of a 
union that works as a nonprofit organization. 
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1. Introduction 
e present some of the analytical consequences of introducing 
endogenous membership in the standard union model. Endogeneity of 
union status in bargaining models has been previously addressed in the 
literature 
i
, and this includes very early references
ii
. However, a simple and clear 
methodological distinction of the issues underlying the final labor market outcome 
has not, to our knowledge, been advanced. 
Hence, the analysis of labor market outcomes in the presence of endogenous 
membership involves three levels of considerations: one is how the union's 
objective function is affected by the number of "insiders" 
iii
. The other is how 
applicants - potential insiders - react to conditions offered by union membership, 
which calls for the definition of a membership demand function. Finally, unions 
may or may not be able to decide membership size - which determines whether the 
union must behave competitively or not towards membership demand. 
Usually, it is not considered explicitly - or it is irrelevant and taken as given - 
how union size affects the union's utility function. On the one hand, for given 
wages and total employment, an increase in membership decreases the probability 
of (union) employment of union members. But also, union size may affect 
positively the union´s ability to behave as a monopoly. Moreover, a larger number 
of members at given wages (say, in an utilitarian environment) would probably be 
seen as a positive fact. On the other hand, as it is the argument behind the median 
voter structure, the decision process ruling union behavior is also a factor affecting 
union's goals. In sum, the union´s objective function may be considered to depend 
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not only on employment and wage but also on membership - its effect on utility 
may be positive or negative. 
The membership function measures how the labor force gets unionized and is 
therefore assumed to be positively related to the wages the union jobs offer 
iv
. 
Some theoretical models of union behavior have treated demand for union services 
as coming from median voter models 
v
. We note that, specially with corporate 
bargaining, the membership function is ultimately related to labor supply - it is as if 
unions, that may behave as a "monopsonist" 
vi
 in the hiring market, make the 
"interface" between the labor supply and firms' labor demand. If closed-shop 
agreements are ruled out, and if the union has no ability to avoid membership - or 
agreements with respect to wages must be extended to any employed worker 
vii
 - it 
will probably have to take into account such fact in optimization - i.e., make 
"conjectures" about membership behavior (demand) or internalise membership 
response to union wages.  
In section I, we discuss the role of endogenous membership and compare the 
situation where a monopoly union behaves as a monopsonist with respect to 
membership demand to the one where it behaves "competitively". Section II 
reproduces the exercise for an environment with efficient bargaining.  
Some special cases are presented in section III, with less usual unions' utility 
functions: directly using absolute unemployment (and wages) as arguments; 
average utility of members; money value of aggregate surplus or "economic rent" 
obtained by members. 
In section IV, we present an analytical and graphical derivation of the 
"microfoundations" of the membership function 
viii
. We diverge from the issues that 
have been previously raised and emphasize the behavior of the union as a nonprofit 
organization facing bargaining costs. 
The modelling is kept as simple as possible in order to focus on the special 
mechanism in study.  
The exposition ends with a brief summary in section V. 
 
2. The Role of Labor Supply - Endogenous Union 
Membership and the Monopoly Union 
1. The demand for union membership will probably increase with the wage set 
by the union, i.e., we consider that membership M, M = M(W) and is increasing in 
W.  
Assume the union maximizes total utility, and the unions' utility depends, as 
usual on total employment, L; wage, W, and also on M, i.e., 
ix
  
 
Max U(L, W, M)        (1) 
L, W, M 
s.t.:      L = L(W)   ; M = M(W) 
 
L(W) denotes a negatively sloped demand for labor 
x
. Alternatively, we can 
write (I.1) as: 
 
Maxw  U[L(W), W, M(W)]       (2) 
 
The optimal solution will be W
M
 such that 
xi
: 
 
U
L
 L
W
 + U
W
 + U
M
 M
W
 = 0      (3) 
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2. Assume U = U(L, W, M) is increasing and quasi-concave in its arguments. 
Then, given that U
M
 and M
W
 are positive, the utility function will be increasing in 
the point W* where union ignores union membership demand, i.e., in the solution 
of: 
 
U
L
[L(W), W, M(W)] L
W
 + U
W
[L(W), W, M(W)] = 0   (4) 
 
which would correspond to the usual monopoly union solution, in the Dunlop 
(1944) tradition. 
Therefore: 
 
W
M
 > W* ;  M
M
 > M* ; L
M
 < L*   (5) 
 
Unemployed members, u(W) = M(W) - L(W), will be more than if union 
membership effect was taken as exogenous, i.e., u
M
 > u*. 
Consider the graphic representation of the problem in the following way: Take 
the problem written as: 
 
Max U[L(W), W, M] = (W, M)      (6) 
W, M 
s.t.:    M = M(W) 
 
(W, M) arises from the substitution of L by labor demand in the general utility 
function U(L, W, M). F.O.C. will yield: 
 
- 
M
W 


 = M
W
   ;          (7) 

W
 = U
L
[L(W), W, M] L
W
 + U
W
[L(W), W, M] ;  
M
 = U
M
[L(W), W, M]   
 
We are assuming 
M
 > 0; a typical “reduced” union indifference curve defined 
over W and M,  (W, M) = 
_
, will be positively sloped near the optimal solution - 
where 
W
 < 0 – and, for an internal solution, concave. Utility increases to 
southeast. The indifference curves will have a point for which 
W
 = 0, 
representing a membership-taker first-order condition: for low wage levels, an 
indifference curve will be negatively sloped. 
The solution of W* and W
M
 are depicted in Fig. 1. W* is the wage at which an 
indifference curve achieves 
W
 = 0 on the membership demand curve, M = M(W). 
Plotting also the underlying demand function L(W), we can visualize not only 
membership, but also demand, and corresponding unemployment level in the two 
situations. 
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Fig. 3  
Figure 1. 
 
3. Suppose that U
M
 < 0. Then, indifference curves - (W, M) = 
_
 - in (M,W) 
space would increase to northwest, we would want them to be convex, and W* 
would be higher than W
M
. 
Proposition 1. If membership demand increases with the wage set in the 
negotiations, and the union´s utility increases with the number of members: 
1. The monopoly union that behaves as a monopsonist in the membership 
market will choose a higher wage, higher membership and lower employment than 
the one that behaves competitively in the membership market. 
2. The opposite occurs if either the membership function is negatively sloped or 
union´s utility function decreases with membership. 
4. Alternatively to formulation (6), the monopoly union problem can be written 
in terms of L and W:  
 
Max   U[L, W, M(W)]  =   (L, W)       (8) 
L, W 
s.t.:    L = L(W) 
 
F.O.C. will yield: 
 
L
W  


  =  - L
W
      ;       
W
  =  U
W
 + U
M
 M
W    (9)
 
 
The graphical representation of this problem is identical to the one in which M 
is taken as exogenous, but with respect to the modified utility function  (L, W). At 
the tangency of the optimal indifference curve with labor demand, provided U
M
 
M
W
 > 0, 
L
W
U
 U
 < 
L
W  


; the tangency with a membership-taker´s indifference 
curve will be to the southeast of the solution (9). 
(9) defines a relation between the wage and employment, W = g(L); its 
intersection with labor demand yields the optimal solution, (W
M
, L
M
) We can see 
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it depicted in Fig. 2. The slope of g(L), 
dL
dg
 = – 
WWWWLWLW
WLWLL
  L   L 
  L 




 (and 
probably positive). Being U
M
 M
W
 > 0, it lies to the left of the function W = h(L), 
solving 
L
W
U
 U
| M=M(W)
  =  - L
W
, which would intersect labor demand at the 
membership-taker solution W*. 
 
 
3. Endogenous Union Membership with Efficient 
Bargaining. 
1. The efficient bargaining solution comes from 
xii
: 
 
Max  U[L,W, M(W)] + B  (L,W)                (10) 
L, W 
 
where B is directly related to the relative power of the employer in negotiations, 
and would yield: 
 
L
W  


  =  
L
W


                    (11) 
 
If the firm('s) is a profit maximizer:   
 
L
W  


  =  
L
WMW
U
 M  U U 
  =  
LF P -W 
L
                 (12) 
 
If U
M
 M
W
 > 0, the locus (L,W) such that 
xiii
 
 
L
W
U
 U
 
| M=M(W)
  =  
LF P -W 
L
                  (13) 
 
will be to the right of the efficient locus given by the tangency points of (14), 
because at any point (L,W): 
 
L
W
U
 U
 
| M=M(W)
  <  
L
WMW
U
 M  U U 
                (14) 
 
So, once 
L
U
U
L
W


 > 0, for each level W, a lower L will be chosen in an efficient 
contract agreement in the case where membership is taken as endogenous. 
Alternatively, at a tangency between an indifference curve and an isoprofit curve 
that satisfies (12), 
L
W
U
 U
 
| M=M(W)
 - the slope of U(L,W,M) = U
_
 evaluated at M = 
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M(W) - is smaller than 
LF P -W 
L
; to achieve tangency of an indifference curve, 
i.e., (14), with the same isoprofit curve, the solution must lie to the southeast of 
(13). CC, defining tangency of indifference curves with isoprofit curves when 
membership is endogenously considered by the union, will be to the left (in space 
(L,W)) of the locus defined by (14) – the contract curve of the traditional 
membership-taker union, so to speak -, C´C´. We can see both curves in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. 
 
3. If U
M
 M
W
 < 0, the conclusions would be reversed and the "monopsonist" 
contract curve lies to the right of the "membership-taker" union - implying that for 
the same employment level, lower wages will be achieved. 
Proposition 2. If membership demand increases with the wage set in the 
negotiations, and the union´s utility increases with the number of members: 
1. The efficient bargaining locus of the "monopsonist" union will lie to the left 
(less L for given W; higher W for given L) of that of the "competitive" union. 
2. The opposite occurs if either the membership function is negatively sloped or 
union´s utility function decreases with membership. 
4. In an efficient contract solution, an increase in membership may decrease B, 
i.e., B = B(M) and B
M
 < 0 -, or decrease the cost of rising wages, and additional 
effect could be in place, this favoring a shift to the right of the contract curve. 
 
4. Analytical Examples 
Case A. Unions Utility Depending on u and W 
1. A special case of U
M
 < 0 would be the utility function of the problem: 
 
Max   U(u, W)                  (15) 
L, W, M, u 
s.t.:     u = M - L ;   L = L(W)   ; M = M(W) 
 
where U
u
 < 0 and U
W
 > 0. We see that U
M
 = U
u
 and U
L
 = - U
u
; so the union 
values employed and total members utility symmetrically. 
Consider the excess supply of members  
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u(W)  =  M(W) - L(W)                 (16) 
 
We have that  
 
u
W
  =  M
W
 - L
W
  >  - L
W
  > 0                (17) 
 
Problem (15) can be written as: 
 
Max   U(u,W)                   (18) 
u W 
s.t.:     u = u(W) 
 
The problem can be represented in the (u,W) space - see Fig. 3. A typical 
indifference curve slopes upward - as well as u(W) - and the utility level increases 
to the northwest.  
 
 
Figure 3. 
 
The optimal solution will be such that: 
 
- 
u
W
U
 U
  =  u
W
  =  M
W
 - L
W
                  (19) 
 
Efficient bargaining satisfies: 
 
Max   U(u,W) + B  (L,W)                 (20) 
L, u, W 
s.t.:     u = M(W) - L 
 
or 
 
Max  U[M(W) - L, W] + B  (L, W)               (21) 
L, W 
 
The optimal solution obeys: 
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- 
u
WWu
U
 U M U 
  =  
LF P -W 
L
      or               (22) 
 
- 
u
W
U
 U
 - M
W
  =  
LF P -W 
L
  =  
L
W


                      (23) 
 
Consider then the problem in space (L,W). We will have that for any tangency,  
 
L
W
U
 U
| M=M(W)
 = - 
u
W
U
 U
 > - 
u
W
U
 U
 - M
W               (24)
 
 
Therefore the efficiency locus CC (monopsonist) in the (L,W) space will lie to 
the right of the curve C´C´ (membership -taker) - the opposite occurring in the (u, 
W) space - given by 
 
L
W
U
 U
| M=M(W)
  =  
L
W


                   (25) 
 
2. Take a particular example where the union´s utility function is of the form: 
 
U(u, W)  =  u
-
 (W - W
a
)

                             (26) 
 
2.1. The monopoly union solution will yield: 
 


 
a W-W 
u
  =  M
W
 - L
W
  =  u
W
                 (27) 
 
Assume that W
a
 = 0. Then, we can manipulate the expression to yield: 
 


  =  u
W
 
u
W
  =  
u,W
  =  (M
W
 
M
W
) 
u
M
 - (L
W
 
L
W
) 
u
L
  =            (28) 
  =  
M
 
u
M
  +  
D
 
u
L
 
 
Denote the unemployment rate u
r
 = 
M
u
. Then, we can solve (28): 
 
u
r
  =  
M D
D
  
  
 





                   (29) 
 
where 
M
 denotes the (positive) elasticity of membership demand (labor 
supply) and 
D
 the labor demand elasticity in absolute value. The unemployment 
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rate will be between 0 and 1 if 
M
 < 


; this condition guarantees that the 
unemployment rare increases with the elasticity of demand. (29) also suggests that 
the unemployment rate will be higher the larger is the elasticity of membership 
demand (labor supply), 
M
 - yet, an interior solution may be impossible for 
constant wage-elasticity labor demands.  
The competitive solution is given by (29) with 
M
 = 0, a lower unemployment 
rate.  
 
2.2. The efficient bargaining locus will be (assuming W
a
 = 0). 
 


 
W
u
 - M
W
  =  
LF P -W 
L
                 (30) 
 
In terms of the unemployment rate: 
 
u
r
  =  
M L
L
P F
(1- )  1
W
P F
 (1- ) 1
W





                  (31) 
 
Proposition 3. If membership demand increases with the wage set in the 
negotiations, and the union´s utility is of the form (26): 
1. The monopoly union solution of the "monopsonist" union will lead to lower 
wages and lower unemployment than the "membership-taker" union.  
2. The efficient bargaining locus of the "monopsonist" union will lie to the right 
(higher L for given W; lower W for given L) of that of the "competitive" union. 
3. The unemployment rate of the "monopsonist" union will respond positively 
to both the elasticity of demand (in absolute value) and the elasticity of the 
membership function with respect to the wage rate. 
Case B. Union Maximizes Average Utility 
Consider that the union maximizes the average utility, i.e., 
 
Max       
M
M)  W,U(L,
                 (32) 
L, W, M 
s.t.:      L = L(W)    ; M = M(W) 
 
or, alternatively: 
 
MaxW    
M(W)
M(W)]  W,U[L(W),
                 (33) 
  
This utility function may be justified in analogous terms as the labor managed 
firm 
xiv
 objective function (revenue per worker): union members, in their decision 
processes concerning letting "outsiders" come in, maximize the "amount of utility" 
that accrues to each member. 
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The F.O.C. for an interior solution will give an optimal W
2M
 such that 
 
 (U
L
 L
W
 + U
W
 + U
M
 M
W
) M - U M
W
 = 0               (34) 
 
Recall that at W
M
, U
L
 L
W
 + U
W
 + U
M
 M
W
 = 0. Therefore, U is (already) 
decreasing at W
M
: as expected (because as W increases M increases, decreasing, 
for fixed U, 
M
U
), W
2M
 < W
M
. The wage is now smaller than in the case where it 
maximizes total utility - demand will be higher, membership lower and the 
unemployment of members lower. 
Let us compare the solution with the one where membership is exogenously 
considered, W*. For this solution, U
L
 L
W
 + U
W
 = 0. So we have two possibilities; 
at W*, either: 
a) U
M
 M
W
  M - U M
W
 > 0, or  U
M
 
U
 M
 > 1 (elasticity of U respect to M is 
larger than 1). 
In this case, at W*, U is increasing and so W
2M
 > W*. We will have, therefore: 
 
 
W* < W
2M
 < W
M                 (35) 
 
 
Graphically, this problem will yield the same conclusions as the one of Case A. 
b) U
M
 M
W
  M - U M
W
 < 0, or  U
M
  
U
 M
 < 1 (elasticity of U respect to M is 
smaller than 1). 
In this case, at W*, U is decreasing and so W
2M
 < W*. We will have, 
therefore: 
 
 
W
2M
 < W* < W
M                  (36)
 
 
 
It is easy to show that the solution of this case will have similar properties as the 
one in the example. Typically, it corresponds to a similar graph as the one of Fig. 3. 
Consider the utilitarian union: U(W, L, M) = L u(W) + (M - L) u(W
a
) = L 
[u(W) - u(W
a
)] + M u(W
a
), where u(W) - increasing and concave in its argument - 
is the typical member utility function. Then the union maximizes the expected 
utility of the representative worker 
xv
 - an objective function well known in the 
literature - 
M
  )]u(W - [u(W) L a
 + u(W
a
), which is equivalent to maximize 
M
  )]u(W - [u(W) L a ; then (III.23) holds as long as W > W
a
. 
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Proposition 4. If membership demand increases with the wage set in the 
negotiations, the union´s utility increases with the number of members, the 
monopoly union maximizes average (over all members) utility and behaves as a 
monopsonist in the membership market: 
1. the wage, membership and unemployment will be lower (and employment 
higher) than if the "monopsonist" union maximizes total utility. 
2. the wage, membership and unemployment will be: 
- lower than if the union behaved "competitively" in the membership market if 
the elasticity of the union´s utility function with respect to M is smaller than one 
(in this case the union´s objective function decreases with M). 
- higher than if the union behaves "competitively" in the membership market if 
the elasticity of the union´s utility function with respect to M is larger than one. 
Case C: Union Maximizes Money Value of Surplus 
Consider the utility function that corresponds to the collective rent 
xvi
. It is 
sometimes assumed that the alternative wage is the one corresponding to the 
equilibrium solution without the union. If we have a membership "demand" 
M = M(W), we can interpret it (as any labor supply curve) as valuing the 
alternative use of time (leisure) by workers. Consider the inverse demand and 
membership functions: 
 
W = W
D
(L)    and     W = W
M
(M)                (37) 
 
Denote by W
a
 the wage that equalizes membership and demand, i.e.: 
 
W
a
 = W
D
(L
a
) = W
M
(L
a
)                 (38) 
 
We can postulate an utility function where what is maximized is the monetary 
surplus of employed members, i.e.: 
 
U(W, L) = W L -  
L
0
 W
M
(u) du                 (39) 
 
The monopoly union problem will be: 
 
Max  W L -  
L
0
 W
M
(u) du                  (40) 
L, W 
s.t.:   W = W
D
(L)   
 
or 
 
Max  W
D
(L) L -  
L
0
 W
M
(u) du                 (41) 
  L 
 
F.O.C. originate: 
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W
D
(L)  +  L 
dL
(L)dW D
  =  W
M
(L)                (42) 
 
that is, marginal revenue of the union - 
dL
 d(WL)
 - equals membership demand 
(labor supply) wage in the employment level (implicitly) chosen.  
Denote the above solution (L
1
,W
1
). Comparing with the solution (L
0
,W
0
), 
corresponding to the rent maximizer union with fixed W
a
 (i.e., that looks at 
membership supply as perfectly elastic at the wage that equates labor demand and 
membership supply) - see Fig. 4 -, we conclude that - as long as membership 
supply is not perfectly elastic - we achieve a lower wage and higher employment in 
the case where the surplus - the area below W until L between W line and the 
membership function - is maximized. 
 
 
Figure 4. 
 
Summarizing: 
Proposition 5. If membership demand increases with the wage set in the 
negotiations, the monopoly union maximizes the members aggregate rent and 
behaves as a monopsonist in the membership market, the wage, membership and 
unemployment will be higher than if the union behaves "competitively" in the 
membership market. It will be lower than if the union considers supply of members 
as perfectly elastic at the “competitive wage”. 
We should notice that even if the union acts with benevolent intentions, say, 
members are altruistic and so is the union, it is still the case that the role of the 
union is very different from the one of a social planner. In some cases, if unions 
behave as monopsonists towards the labor market, the outcome may be worse in 
terms of unemployment than if they did not; in others, it may be better. 
Notwithstanding that it is (still...) the case, behind these models, that unions are 
considered a means of achieving redistribution purposes but not efficiency. 
 
5. Membership Fees and Bargaining Costs: Wage 
Determination and Membership Demand 
We have considered a membership demand function M(W) without referring to 
its formation 
xvii
. On the one hand, one can - specially if corporate bargaining is 
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considered - interpret it as labor supply. Alternatively, we could see it as arising 
from a more general problem and identify membership response to membership 
fees in general form 
xviii
. 
1. Denote membership fees by a. Membership demand will likely be 
 
M = M(W, a)  ; M
W
 > 0 ; M
a
 < 0              (43) 
 
Let C denote union bargaining costs. They will be increasing in M and, 
eventually, W. 
 
C = C(M, W)                  (44) 
 
The union behaves as a nonprofit organization, i.e., works under a budget 
constraint (which gives rise to membership supply M = M
S
(W, a)): 
 
C(M, W) = M a                  (45) 
 
The union´s utility function will depend negatively on a, once members income 
decreases as a increases: 
 
U = U(L, W, M, a)                  (46) 
 
The monopoly union problem can be written as: 
 
Max  U(L, W, M, a)                  (47) 
L, W, M, a 
s.t.:    L = L(W)  ; M = M(W, a) ;  C(M, W) = M a 
 
Let us consider the restrictions (44) and (45). We can derive: 
 
a  =  
M
W)C(M,
                  (48) 
 
Replacing in the membership demand function (43), M = M(W, a), we get: 
 
M  =  M[W, 
M
W)C(M,
]                 (49) 
 
From an explicit form (49), we can solve for M = M(W). Graphically - see Fig. 
7 -, we can see how this function is formed. In the space (M,W), we have the union 
average cost curves (for different levels of W); say curve C0 corresponds to the 
average cost of attaining wage W0, i.e., has the form a = M
) WC(M, 0  and C1, for a 
given W1 > W0, a = M
) WC(M, 1 ; The intersection of these curves with 
M = M(W0, a) and M = M(W1, a) respectively, yields a membership/membership 
fees relation M = M(a). To each intersection corresponds, therefore a given level of 
M - the relation M = M(W) is represented in quadrant II. From here we conclude 
that M(W) may not be positively sloped - it will not be if average costs rise 
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sufficiently fast with W relative to the shift of M(a, W); it will have the same slope 
as M(a). The relation between a and W is in quadrant IV and will always be 
positive.  
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
If we replace restrictions (48) and (49) on the utility function we will obtain a 
problem of the general form of (I.1) which arguments are L, M and W: 
 
Max  U[L, W, M, 
M
W)C(M,
]                 (50) 
L, W, M 
s.t.:    L = L(W)  ; M = M(W) = M[W, 
M
W)C(M,
] 
 
Analogously, an efficient solution will answer: 
 
Max  U[L, W, M, 
M
W)C(M,
] + B [P F(L) - W L]              (51) 
L, W, M 
s.t.:    M = M(W) = M[W, 
M
W)C(M,
] 
 
2. The previous problem assumes - as noted before - the union behaves as a 
monopsonist in the "membership market" - the labor market. That is, presumably, a 
reasonable assumption in "corporate systems". But assume, instead, that the union 
behaves competitively. This would correspond to the following: 
The union, given membership M, decides 
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Max  U(L, W, M, a)                  (52) 
L, W, a 
s.t.:    L = L(W)  ;  C(M, W) = M a 
 
That is: 
 
Max  U[L, W, M, 
M
W)C(M,
]                 (53) 
L, W 
s.t.:    L = L(W) 
 
The solution of the problem will yield W and L as a function of M. Then, we 
can write: 
 
M = M
S
(W)                   (54) 
 
Using the budget constraint, we can also obtain 
 
a  =  
(W)M
(W)]M C[W,
S
S
  =  a
S
(W)                (55) 
 
Competitive equilibrium in the "membership market" can be derived from: 
 
M = M
S
(W)    ;     a = a
S
(W)      ;      M = M(W, a)              (56) 
 
Ultimately, in this market we observe wage determination. Notice that this 
setting represents the problem 
 
Max  U(L, W, M)                   (57) 
L, W 
s.t.:    L = L(W)  
 
and exogenous "membership demand" M = M(W) to which endogenous M 
solution was compared to. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper gathers some notes and enlargements to the standard collective 
bargaining problem in which unions maximize utility and firms maximize profits. 
We extended the simple standard model in order to include membership 
considerations, introducing a union membership demand positively related to 
wages - eventually arising in a setting where unions behave as nonprofit 
organizations. 
In some cases, wages and unemployment will be higher (the contract curve will 
shift to the right in efficient bargaining) when the monopoly union can behave as a 
monopsonist towards the labor supply or membership demand than when it acts 
competitively, i.e., take membership as exogenously given. This will occur if 
union's utility function depends positively on number of members. The opposite is 
expected if the unions' decision process values negatively the number of members. 
Some examples of both cases are presented as an illustration.  
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This study contains an additional point to the explanation of the hump-shaped 
relation between wages and centralization in wage bargaining 
xix
, here working 
through awareness of labor supply response, rather than union (or firm-union) 
rivalry. If membership is seen as more elastic to the wage rate when bargaining is 
coordinated economy-wide, provided that the decision process imply that unions 
value negatively the number of "insiders", a monopsonist union - representing the 
corporate bargaining result - will choose a lower wage and lower unemployment 
than the "competitive" or "membership-taker" union - this being associated to a 
smaller degree level of centralization, as in industry-wide bargaining. 
 
 
Notes 
 
i See Booth (1995), section 4.6, pp. 108-116, for a thorough recent survey. 
ii Dunlop (1944), cited in Farber (1986), considers a membership function increasing in the wage rate 
net of membership fees. 
iii Using Lindbeck & Snower (1990) term. Notice that we will never measure "outsiders", so we do 
not have a really insider-outsider scenario. 
iv There are empirical arguments justifying the use of such function. Duncan & Leigh (1985), for 
example, provide an empirical analysis involving the treatment of endogeneity of union status, not 
rejected by statistical tests in their study. See Booth (1995), section 6, pp. 157-182 and references 
therein.  
v Grossman (1983), for example, analyses endogenous membership in a system with seniority rules 
and prohibited closed shops. Booth (1984) links membership demand to individual decision of 
potential members which compare union's expected payoff with available alternatives.  
vi We do not follow the interpretation of Lewis (1959), cited in Farber (1986), that the union wants to 
´extract from the members all the rents (...)´ through membership fees, but instead we think of an 
union that may eventually behave as a nonprofit organization. 
vii This is a feature of the Portuguese bargaining results, for example. 
viii Relative demand for union status has been modelled as a function of wages by, for example, Booth 
& Chatterji (1993) in an open shop scenario. They arrive at a union membership demand function 
where union density is a function of the wages net of membership fees, convex in gross wages. See 
also Naylor & Raaum (1993) and Naylor & Cripps (1993). More recently, membership demand has 
received attention in the open shop union literature - see Corneo (1997), Holmlund & Lundborg 
(1999) and Moreton (2001). 
ix We consider that the union cannot avoid membership. If it could, the second restriction would be 
replaced by M  M(W) and, if M(W) is positively sloped, would only become active at very low 
levels of W. 
x If the firm behaves competitively maximizing profits, the restriction L = L(W) is equivalent to P 
F
L
(L) = W. 
xi Second-order condition requiring 
  U
L
 L
WW
 + U
LL
 L
W
2
 + 2 U
LW
 L
W
 + U
WW
 + 
+2 U
LM
 L
W
M
W
+2 U
WM
 L
W
M
W
 +2 U
MM
M
W
2
 + U
M
M
WW
 ≤ 0  
This is consistent with both positive or negative U
M
. 
xii See Earle & Pencavel (1990) - the "canonical bargaining form". The Nash maximand solution 
  Max  [U(L,W) - U
_
]

 [ (L,W) - P
_
] 
  L, W 
considered to arise in a bargaining where alternatives to agreement are U
_
 and P
_
 for the parties 
involved, would complicate some of the mathematics - and gives the same efficient combinations 
(L,W).  corresponds to the ratio of the firm discount rate to the union´s discount rate, and will, 
therefore, be higher the higher the relative bargaining power of the union. See Layard, Nickell & 
Jackman (1991), for example. 
xiii As in McDonald & Solow 's (1981) traditional contract curve. 
xiv Vanek (1970) is the mandatory reference for the analysis of the labor-managed economy, being the 
firm's objective function value-added per worker; we use the same argument to postulate the 
objective function of the union: total utility - whatever it may be, representing a measure of the 
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aggregate social welfare of members - per member. This analysis is a form of modelling 
motivations behind the decision on the number of "insiders" and is a way to go around the well-
known median voter problem of equilibrium determinacy with union-wage setting. 
xv Which may differ from the median voter's expected utility, as noted in Booth (1995), for example. 
Notice that the traditional median voter conclusions would not be applicable once voters also decide 
on the number of voters... 
xvi See, for example, Kaufman (1991) for the analytical illustration of the monopoly union solution 
when the alternative wage is fixed or exogenous. de Menil (1971), cited in Blair & Crawford 
(1984), assumes that "unions maximize the surplus above the opportunity cost of the employed 
labour". 
xvii We also ignore leadership problems or voting mechanisms - including seniority issues. These have 
been dealt with in the literature - see Farber (1986) for references. The considerations on 
membership in this paper would therefore apply with more accuracy to corporate bargaining 
settings. 
xviii See the reference to and alternative derivations in Farber (1986). More recently, Booth & Chatterji 
(1995) that models a union as a nonprofit-seeking provider; Booth & Chatterji (1993), Naylor & 
Raaum (1993) and Naylor & Cripps (1993) model social custom, solidarity and reputation in 
membership demand. 
xix See, for example, Calmfors & Driffill (1988). Also, Tarantelli (1986). Flanagan (1999) contains a 
recent review of international evidence. 
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